

August 4, 2014

BUILDING NUCLEAR-FREE SECURITY IN EAST ASIA

Immediate Actions for Governments

The Meeting in Hiroshima reminds us of a simple truth; nuclear weapons are inherently indiscriminate and their use would kill innocent men, woman, and children on a massive scale. The reality of that human impact must be faced by all nuclear-armed states. Those states possessing nuclear weapons should attend the next conference on the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons, to be held in Vienna on 8-9 December 2014, and work constructively to eliminate the danger posed by nuclear weapons.

All members of the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be reminded that they are legally committed to work in good faith to eliminate nuclear weapons. Movement toward disarmament by those states and other nuclear-armed states should not be deferred or await some future improvement in either global or regional security.

A search for nuclear-free security requires a new perspective on conventional wisdom. Although we are mindful of the role that security guarantees play in strengthening regional security, the United States and its allies must take a realistic attitude toward the limited role that nuclear weapons play in the provision of such guarantees. Phrases such as the “nuclear umbrella” place unnecessary and misleading emphasis on nuclear capabilities.

Recognizing the need for serious multilateral process to address these issues, we call upon the leaders-level East Asia Summit to agree at its November 2014 EAS to set the 2015 EAS as the target for announcements of agreed regional security principles and the implementation of major regional confidence building measures, and establish expert working groups to facilitate that process.

We call on all world leaders, especially the leaders of nuclear-armed states, to visit the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to more fully understand the catastrophic consequences of any use of nuclear weapons.

The Responsibility of Civil Society and the Media

We strongly support the role of civil society organizations and the media

- in articulating basic principles, especially the devastating humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use,
- identifying agenda for government action,
- energizing effective government responses,
- mobilizing philanthropic resource to support research and education,
- promoting mutual understanding and respect among people especially through education and peace movements in each country.

We strongly support the role of the people and governments of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

- in continuing to remind future generations of the reality and tragedy of atomic weapons use,
- in sharing the experiences and messages of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with the international community, and
- in taking strong leadership to achieve a nuclear free world.

Detailed Proposals for Nuclear-Free Security in East Asia

East Asia is a region that faces nuclear proliferation as in North Korea, inter-state conflicts over territorial control that may develop into war, and a marked dependence on nuclear deterrence and extended deterrence. In such a milieu of real and potential conflicts, a search for regional nuclear-free security requires attention to both confidence building in the general sense and also confidence building that concerns nuclear weapons in particular.

In the following, we will address the basic principles that guide our proposals, followed by proposals on general and nuclear confidence building measures, along with requests to each key regional government actor.

(1) Basic Principles

1. As the horror of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrates, nuclear weapons are the most indiscriminately inhumane weapons ever devised. The case for their ultimate elimination is overwhelming.
2. So long as any state possesses nuclear weapons, others will want them as well. The indefinite retention of nuclear weapons shall eventually result in the use of nuclear weapons by misadventure if not by deliberate design. And any such use would be catastrophic for the world as we know it.
3. A nuclear war cannot be won, and must never be fought. The damage from a nuclear exchange will outweigh any conceivable benefit or gain.
4. Movement toward disarmament should not be deferred or await some future improvement in either global or regional security. Efforts toward disarmament can reinforce global and regional security, and therefore can and should be pursued in tandem.
5. Pending the elimination of nuclear weapons, nuclear-armed states

should pledge never to use nuclear weapons when conventional weapons are sufficient to achieve legitimate military purposes. States that enjoy security guarantees from nuclear weapons states, such as Japan, should also endorse this principle.

6. Nuclear-armed countries should work energetically to prevent proliferation. All the countries have responsibility to strengthen their own domestic controls on dangerous and dual-use technologies, as well as an obligation to strengthen international efforts to prevent proliferation.

(2) General Confidence Building Measures

1. All states should pledge to resolve disputes or disagreements between them by peaceful means. In particular, all states should pledge to exercise restraint, avoid provocation, and forego the use of force in the settlement of territorial disagreements or disputes.

2. All states should consult through bilateral and regional dialogues to improve regional security and strategic stability.

3. States should agree to the establishment of so-called “hot-lines” to ensure communication at all relevant levels of authority, including the executive, ministerial, and theater command levels.

4. All states should participate in the promulgation and observance of codes of conduct in the aerial, maritime, space and cyber-security domains.

5. All states should improve transparency regarding military forces, including strategic forces for deterrence.

6. Regional states should recognize the role that regional peace and stability continues to play in economic prosperity in Northeast Asia and throughout the world.

7. All nations should be reminded that the use of chemical and biological weapons is not only indefensible morally but also unlawful under international law.

(3) Nuclear Confidence Building Measures

1. Pending the reduction and ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals, all nuclear-armed states should commit to reduce the number of nuclear weapons to the lowest levels consistent with their security and that of their allies. Nuclear-armed states should work toward the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons, whether under a nuclear weapons convention or other legal measure. Until such time, those states should conduct preparatory work regarding effective verification and enforcement mechanisms with a view toward disarmament.

2. All nuclear-armed states should accept that the only role of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear war. All states have an obligation to ensure their nuclear policies are consistent with generally recognized law of armed conflict, including the principles of necessity, proportionality and discrimination.

3. The states with the largest nuclear weapon stockpiles have an obligation to continue to reduce the number of nuclear weapons. Other states should commit not to take advantage of the bilateral US-Russian arms reduction process to seek nuclear parity or to engage in an arms race.

4. Those states pursuing advanced conventional capabilities, including missile defenses and long-range precision strike capabilities, should make special efforts to ensure these capabilities strengthen regional security without undermining strategic stability.

5. All states should declare their past production of fissile material, including current stockpiles, implement the strongest safeguards including the Additional Protocol, and work toward a comprehensive prohibition on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes.

6. Nuclear-armed states should explore using bilateral transparency measures regarding strategic forces and their supporting infrastructure to build confidence.

7. Non-nuclear weapons states should ratify the additional protocol

and comply with their safeguards agreement.

8. North Korea should take verifiable steps to end its nuclear and missile programs in compliance with its treaty obligations and resolutions of the United Nations Security Council.

Specific Responsibilities of Key Governments

We call upon the United States

- to negotiate with Russia a follow-on agreement to New START treaty designed not only to dramatically further reduce the number of deployed strategic weapons, but also to make major reductions in the number of all nuclear weapons in their respective stockpiles;
- to state that the US does not seek to develop any military capability, including conventional long-range strike systems, for the purpose of affecting the strategic balance with Russia or China;
- to announce that the sole purpose of the nuclear arsenal is to deter the threat or use of nuclear weapons by others;
- to intensify efforts to secure Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as soon as possible.

We call upon China

- pending the reduction and ultimately elimination of its nuclear arsenal in accordance with its NPT obligations, to continue to keep its nuclear arsenal at its present level;
- to reaffirm its self-defensive nuclear strategy and commitments including unconditional No First Use, the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack, and unconditional Negative Security Assurances;
- to affirm a policy of minimum effective nuclear retaliatory capability, and continue its policy of restraint in not seeking parity with US and Russia and to make available sufficient information that will increase transparency and give the international community confidence in its

commitments;

- to persuade the National People's Congress to ratify the CTBT without waiting upon the US or any other necessary party to complete that process first, or at least seek to negotiate simultaneous ratification with the US;
- to create favorable conditions for a summit with the Japanese government at the immediate possible date, acknowledging the consequences of escalating tensions between China and Japan;
- to continue to take all possible and appropriate steps, together with other participants in the Six Party Talks, to persuade North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons facilities and capability in order to achieve the permanent denuclearization of, and sustainable peace on, the Korean peninsula.

We call upon Japan

- to continue her efforts of calling for the abolition of nuclear weapons, reminding the world of the horrific humanitarian consequences of the use of atomic weapons that took place in Hiroshima and Nagasaki;
- to recognize that continued support for nuclear protection in non-nuclear threat contingencies is inconsistent in principle with the serious commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons, and that extended deterrence need not mean extended *nuclear* deterrence;
- to support initiatives taken by nuclear powers to reduce the numbers, targets, and role of nuclear weapons in their military strategies;
- to promote international efforts on nuclear non-proliferation, and to assist the IAEA in monitoring the development of nuclear energy-related facilities;
- complimenting Japan's decision to remove 500 kilo-grams of fissile material, to continue its efforts to "minimize" fissile material stockpiles;
- to create favorable conditions for a summit with the Chinese government at the immediate possible date, acknowledging the consequences of escalating tensions between Japan and China;.

- to search possibilities for security not dependent on nuclear deterrence, by exploring a regional process that will build confidence among potential adversaries so that each power may reduce reliance on nuclear deterrence for her security.