

Executive Summary



Hiroshima Report 2026

Evaluation of Achievement in Nuclear Disarmament,
Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security in 2025

March 2026

About the Hiroshima Report The *Hiroshima Report* attempts to help the movement toward a world without nuclear weapons—firstly, by clarifying the current status of the issues and efforts surrounding nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and nuclear security. In doing so, it aims to encourage increased debate on these issues by policy-makers, experts in and outside governments, and civil society. Furthermore, by issuing this report from Hiroshima, where a nuclear weapon was once used, it aims to help focus attention and promote further actions across various fields toward the realization of a world without nuclear weapons.

The Hiroshima Report 2026: Evaluation of Achievement of Nuclear Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security in 2025 is an outcome of the “Hiroshima Report Publication Project,” commissioned by Hiroshima Organization for Global Peace (HOPE) to the Center for Disarmament, Science and Technology (CDAST), the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA). As with previous reports issued annually since 2013, the *Hiroshima Report 2026* is published in both English and Japanese. This project has been conducted as a part of the “Hiroshima for Global Peace” Plan launched by Hiroshima Prefecture in 2011.

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Hiroshima Organization for Global Peace (HOPE)
Peace Promotion Project Team, Regional Policy
Bureau, Hiroshima Prefectural Government
10-52 Motomachi, Naka-ku, Hiroshima
730-8511 Japan
<https://www.pref.hiroshima.lg.jp/site/hiroshimaforpeace-en/>
hope@hiroshimaforpeace.com

Edited by:

Center for Disarmament, Science and Technology (CDAST),
The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)
3rd Floor Toranomon Daibiru-East Building
3-8-1 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo
100-0013 Japan
<https://www.jia.or.jp/en/>
cdast@jia.or.jp

In 2025, there was little progress in nuclear disarmament. Nuclear-armed states have not intensified their efforts to fulfill their disarmament commitments, while a substantial nuclear arms race has continued to unfold. Amid Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine and escalating regional tensions, the risks of nuclear weapons use has been growing. Nuclear issues concerning North Korea and Iran also remain unresolved, with no sign of progress. Despite these deeply concerning trends, efforts to prevent the further deterioration of the nuclear situation were unsuccessful. Divisions surrounding nuclear issues have deepened not only between nuclear-armed states and non-nuclear-weapons states (NNWS) but also, more critically, among nuclear-armed states themselves, making it harder to reach agreements on nuclear issues.

The major trends in nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and nuclear security observed in 2025 are as follows. The situation has become increasingly serious.

Items and Countries Surveyed in the *Hiroshima Report 2026*

<p>Items (78)</p>	<p>Nuclear Disarmament: 41 Nuclear Non-Proliferation: 19 Nuclear Security: 18</p>
<p>Countries Surveyed (34)</p>	<p>NWS: China, France, Russia, the U.K. and the U.S. Non-NPT parties: India, Israel and Pakistan Non-nuclear-weapon states: Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation: Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Germany, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria and Türkiye Nuclear security: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Finland, Germany, Iran, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye and the UAE Other: North Korea*</p>

* North Korea declared its suspension from the NPT in 1993 and its withdrawal in 2003, and has conducted in total six nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, 2013, 2016 (twice) and 2017. However, there is no agreement among the states parties on North Korea’s official status.

1. Nuclear Disarmament

Amid the continued stagnation and regression in nuclear disarmament, various efforts and proposals were advanced to reverse these trends and reinvigorate the process. However, despite these initiatives, the deteriorating state of nuclear disarmament showed little improvement, as nuclear-armed states made minimal progress toward new agreements or the implementation of concrete disarmament measures.

The United States reached out to Russia and China to discuss potential nuclear arms control and reduction agreements, but no progress was made—including in negotiations toward a successor treaty to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) between the United States and Russia.

Nuclear-armed states continue to underscore the importance of nuclear deterrence in their national security strategies while modernizing their nuclear forces. Particular attention has been focused on the rapid expansion of China's nuclear arsenal and the potential evolution of its nuclear strategy, especially concerning its no-first-use posture. NNWS allied with nuclear-armed states also continue to place significant emphasis on extended nuclear deterrence, which has drawn growing criticism from other NNWS.

The number of countries that have signed or ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)—which, among other provisions, prohibits the possession and use of nuclear weapons—continues to grow steadily. However, nuclear-armed states and their allies have maintained their position of refusing to sign the treaty.

Status of Nuclear Forces (estimates)

- While the total number of nuclear weapons has gradually declined to an estimat-

ed 12,241, the number of nuclear warheads in military stockpiles—excluding those retired—as well as those deployed with operational forces, is estimated to have increased.

- China has accelerated the expansion of its nuclear arsenal, with an estimated increase of 100 warheads in just one year. India, Pakistan and North Korea have also been gradually increasing their stockpiles of nuclear warheads over the past decade.

Commitment to Achieving a World without Nuclear Weapons

- No country openly opposes the goals of “the total elimination of nuclear weapons” and “a world without nuclear weapons.” However, in 2025, nuclear-armed states made little progress in taking steady and concrete steps toward implementing and advancing nuclear disarmament to achieve these objectives. Consequently, many NNWS have intensified their criticism of this lack of progress.
- 147 countries, including the United Kingdom, voted in favor of the Japan-led UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution titled “Steps to building a common roadmap towards a world without nuclear weapons.” However, China, Russia, North Korea and other states voted against it.

Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons

- NNWS, particularly those belonging to the “humanitarian group,” have continued to emphasize the humanitarian dimensions of nuclear weapons in various forums, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) and the Third Meeting of States Parties of the TPNW.

- A resolution was adopted at the 2025 World Health Assembly to mandate the World Health Organization to update its previous reports on the effects of nuclear war on health, health services, and the environment.
- The Independent Scientific Panel on the Effects of Nuclear War, established in 2024, held its first meeting in September. The Panel will produce a comprehensive report and submit it to the UNGA in 2027.

TPNW

- By the end of 2025, a total of 74 countries had become States Parties to the TPNW.
- TPNW signatory and supporting states, along with the Scientific Advisory Group (SAG), are constructively preparing for the first Review Conference of the TPNW, scheduled for the end of 2026.
- Nuclear-armed states and their allies remain opposed to the TPNW. Japan ultimately decided not to participate as an observer in the Third Conference of the States Parties (CSP) held in 2025, despite earlier speculation that it might do so.

Reduction of Nuclear Weapons

- Since 2023, Russia has continued to suspend its participation in New START, refusing to provide data exchanges or allow on-site inspections. Although it claims to remain within the treaty's numerical limits, its actual compliance has not been verified.
- In 2025, no nuclear-armed state announced any new concrete plans or proposals for further reductions of nuclear weapons. The United States reached out to Russia and China to initiate bilateral arms control and reduction discussions.

However, Russia declined, citing what it described as hostile U.S. policies and the need to include France and the United Kingdom in discussions, while stating that it would continue to comply with New START provisions for one year after the treaty's expiration. China reiterated that it would not engage in such discussions unless the United States and Russia—the world's two largest nuclear powers—undertake further reductions in their nuclear arsenals.

- All nuclear-armed states continue to modernize their nuclear forces. Russia and North Korea have been actively developing and deploying various new delivery systems for nuclear warheads. China has also significantly expanded and enhanced its nuclear forces, both qualitatively and quantitatively. The United States estimates that China could be capable of deploying more than 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030.

Diminishing the Roles and Significance of Nuclear Weapons in the National Security Strategies and Policies

- As Russia's invasion of Ukraine continues, it has repeatedly issued nuclear threats throughout 2025, heightening international concerns over the potential use of nuclear weapons.
- North Korea has stated that the role of its nuclear arsenal is both to deter war and to seize the initiative in the event of conflict, while highlighting that the development of its nuclear arsenal is irreversible. It has explicitly acknowledged the possibility of first use of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, North Korea continues to strengthen its nuclear forces from both strategic and tactical perspectives.

- There were no significant changes in the policies of nuclear-weapon states (NWS) or other nuclear-armed states regarding sole purpose, no-first-use, or negative security assurances (NSAs). In response to allegations that China's long-standing policies of minimum deterrence and no-first-use may be shifting, China has maintained that its nuclear policy and posture remain unchanged.
- France has expanded previous calls for European allies to participate in its nuclear deterrence exercises, while initiating a debate on the role of French nuclear deterrence in protecting European allies and the potential stationing of French nuclear weapons on their soil.
- Russia and Belarus have reaffirmed that tactical nuclear weapons have been deployed on Belarusian territory, although this claim has not been independently verified.
- The United Kingdom has announced that it will acquire nuclear-capable F-35A fighter jets and join NATO's dual-capable aircraft nuclear mission (DCA) in the context of extended nuclear deterrence.
- NATO member states such as Poland and the Baltic states have expressed their openness to hosting French or British nuclear weapons on their territories as part of nuclear-sharing arrangements.
- Japan and South Korea have been actively collaborating with the United States to strengthen their respective extended deterrence frameworks.
- Following the signing of a mutual defense agreement with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan's Defense Minister stated that his country's nuclear arsenal could be made available to Saudi Arabia if necessary, although no official statement has confirmed these remarks.
- Extended nuclear deterrence arrangements have faced particularly strong criticism at the 2025 NPT PrepCom, primarily from China, Russia, and NAM states.

De-alerting and Measures to Extend Decision Time for Nuclear Weapon Use

- There have been no changes in the policies of nuclear-armed states regarding the alert status of their nuclear forces. Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear forces are considered to remain on high alert.
- China has denied allegations that it has been placing any of its nuclear forces on higher alert.
- Pakistan has accused India of raising the operational readiness of its nuclear arsenal, an allegation rejected by India.

CTBT

- Among the 44 states listed in Annex 2 of the CTBT, whose ratification is required for the treaty to enter into force, six states (China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Russia, and the United States) have signed but not ratified, while three (India, Pakistan, and North Korea) have not signed at all. As a result, the treaty has not yet entered into force.
- Except for North Korea, all countries that have declared possession of nuclear weapons maintain a moratorium on nuclear explosion tests.
- However, U.S. President Trump announced that the United States would immediately resume nuclear testing, accusing other states of carrying out such tests. In response, Russian President Putin ordered an assessment of whether a reciprocal response would be appropriate, adding that Russia would conduct a

nuclear test if the United States did.

- North Korea has reportedly completed preparations for a nuclear explosion test; however, it did not carry out such a test in 2025.
- Some nuclear-armed states are believed to have conducted nuclear tests without explosions, including subcritical experiments and computer simulations.

FMCT

- At the 2025 session of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, states once again failed to commence negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). Pakistan continues to strongly oppose a treaty that would only prohibit the future production of fissile material for military purposes.
- China, India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan have not yet declared a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. It is believed that India, North Korea, and Pakistan continue to produce fissile material for military purposes. There are also concerns that China's advanced fast-breeder reactors and reprocessing facilities, although developed for civilian use, could be diverted for military purposes.
- The first ministerial meeting of the "Friends of the FMCT," a group launched by Japan in 2024, was held in New York. Member countries include Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States, and three other states.

Transparency Regarding Nuclear Forces, Fissile Material, and Nuclear Doctrines

- There has been no significant change

in the transparency policies of nuclear-armed states.

- Although China emphasizes the importance of transparency in its intentions and policies, it has not disclosed any information about the types or numbers of its nuclear forces.
- One of the recommendations of the International Group of Eminent Persons for a World Without Nuclear Weapons (IGEP), sponsored by Japan, called for China, France, and the United Kingdom to enhance transparency by engaging in discussion on their respective conceptions of minimum nuclear deterrence.

Nuclear Disarmament Verification

- The International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) held a working meeting and identified potential areas for continued work, including transportation verification exercises, expanded use of national technical means, and applications of emerging technologies to strengthen verification confidence.
- Several working papers on nuclear disarmament verification were submitted throughout 2025, highlighting the importance of concrete verification measures to enhance mutual trust and guarantee irreversibility.

Irreversibility

- The United States and Russia are believed to be continuing the dismantlement or conversion of their respective strategic delivery systems, nuclear warheads, and surplus fissile material. However, neither country has provided detailed reports on the specific status of these efforts.
- Russia withdrew from the U.S.-Russian Plutonium Management and Disposition

tion Agreement (PMDA), which requires both countries to dispose of 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium no longer needed for military purposes.

Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education and Cooperation with Civil Society

- At the NPT PrepCom, the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education, diversity and inclusion (particularly gender), and the participation of civil society were emphasized.
- The “Youth Leader Fund for a World without Nuclear Weapons” established by Japan welcomed its second cohort of 100 participants, 50 of whom will be selected for a fully funded study tour to Japan, including visits to Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
- Some countries have begun to divest from, or prohibit lending to, organizations and companies involved in the production and development of nuclear weapons. An increasing number of companies are also independently adopting such policies.

Hiroshima and Nagasaki Peace Memorial Ceremonies

- Representatives from 120 countries attended the peace memorial ceremony in Hiroshima, while representatives from 94 countries attended the ceremony in Nagasaki. This year, Russia and Belarus were notified of the ceremony rather than formally invited, while Israel resumed its attendance after not being invited in 2024.

2. Nuclear Non-Proliferation

As of December 2025, 191 countries have acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, three nuclear-armed states—India and Pakistan, which possess nuclear weapons, and Israel which has not denied possessing them—remain outside the treaty and are considered unlikely to join the treaty in the near future.

North Korea has insisted that it has no intention to renounce its nuclear weapons. Russia has continued its cooperation with North Korea, and there is various information regarding cooperation in nuclear and ballistic missile technologies.

In response to the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, Iran has consistently expanded its suspension of compliance with the nuclear restrictions outlined in the agreement. Iran has increased its production of enriched uranium, and its stockpile has grown significantly.

There are assessments that Iran’s nuclear breakout time has been delayed. On the other hand, it has become increasingly difficult to verify nuclear facilities under the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) safeguards.

The number of countries that have accepted the IAEA safeguards under the Additional Protocol has steadily increased. However, more than 30 countries have yet to sign them.

Acceptance and Compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Obligations

- No progress has been achieved in addressing the North Korean nuclear issue, despite the commencement of the 2nd Trump administration, which held a summit in its previous term and the South Korean new administration’s policy toward North Korea. Pyongyang has

insisted that it would never relinquish its status as a “nuclear-weapons state” and that it must rather strengthen it. Russia has asserted that North Korea's nuclear development is a means to ensure its security.

- Iran has expanded its stockpile of enriched uranium, including 20% and 60% highly enriched uranium (HEU). The total stockpile of its enriched uranium has increased by more than 3,200kg since 2024. Israel and the United States attacked Iran's enrichment facilities to prevent Iran's nuclear weapons possession. There are various evaluations that Iran's breakout time was delayed by those attacks; on the other hand, safeguards implementation and transparency on the Iranian enrichment program have been affected.
- Israel and the United States did not participate in the sixth Conference on Establishing a Middle East Region Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

IAEA Safeguards

- As of June 2025, 144 NPT NNWS have concluded the IAEA Additional Protocols. Some non-aligned countries, as well as Brazil, Iran, and Russia, argue that the conclusion of an Additional Protocol should be voluntary, not obligatory under the NPT.
- The IAEA had applied integrated safeguards to 71 NNWS by the end of 2024.
- Iran has continued to suspend verification and monitoring measures under the JCPOA, including the application of the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement. The IAEA reported that due to its inability, it has lost continuity of knowledge regarding the pro-

duction and inventory of centrifuges and other equipment.

- The IAEA reported that it could not resolve the issues regarding the accuracy and completeness of declarations for four sites related to Iran's alleged past clandestine nuclear program. The IAEA Board of Governors' June 2025 resolution found that Iran's reporting on these activities was insufficient.
- Following the attacks by Israel and the United States in June, Iran enacted legislation suspending its cooperation with the IAEA. After the law took effect, discussions began between the IAEA and Iran on the resuming verification activities, and an initial agreement on measures was reached. However, Iran declared the termination of that agreement in response to the IAEA Board of Governors resolution in November.
- Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS) and the IAEA started technical discussions on implementing IAEA safeguards for the nuclear fuel used in Australia's nuclear-powered submarines. Some countries, including China, expressed criticism and concerns on this issue.
- Russia's attack and occupation of nuclear facilities in Ukraine have compelled the IAEA to undertake challenging safeguard verification activities within Ukraine.

Implementing Appropriate Export Controls on Nuclear-Related Items and Technologies

- Most members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) implement solid export controls, including the establishment of legislative measures and other relevant national implementation systems. On

the other hand, many countries, particularly developing countries, have been requested to strengthen their systems and implement export controls.

- Following the suspension of the UN Security Council North Korea Sanction Committee's Panel of Experts in 2024, the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT), established by like-minded countries, published reports on North Korea's cyber activities and cooperation with Russia.
- North Korea continues to procure funds through cryptocurrency theft and dispatching IT workers abroad, while also stealing technology via cyberattacks. Cooperation with Russia in ballistic missiles and nuclear fields has also been reported.
- The snapback mechanism, which reimposes restrictions and sanctions from past UN Security Council resolutions, has been activated, resuming nuclear non-proliferation-related sanctions against Iran.
- China has been criticized for its export of nuclear power reactors to Pakistan, which may constitute a violation of the NSG guideline.

Transparency in the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy

- Since 2018, China has not submitted its reports based on the Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium. While the United States did not publish its report in 2025, following its non-publication in 2024.

3. Nuclear Security

Russia's occupation of the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant continues, and there have been multiple attacks —particularly drone strikes— on the power grid that connects to other nuclear power plants in Ukraine. As a result of these incidents, nuclear safety and security in those facilities are at risk. In addition, in June 2025, Israel and the United States conducted strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities, raising serious concerns about the safety of safeguarded civilian nuclear infrastructure

The threat of cyber-attacks against nuclear facilities as well as sabotage involving drones continues to require close attention. While Artificial Intelligence (AI) is utilized for nuclear security, there are concerns about the risks that it poses to nuclear security.

Regarding the global inventory of weapons-usable nuclear material, progress has been made in efforts to minimize Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). On the other hand, the stockpile of civilian separated plutonium has continued to increase.

Pakistan announced its intent to receive the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission during 2026.

Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Facilities

- Regarding the global inventory of weapons-usable nuclear material, stocks of military-use separated plutonium in India, Israel, Pakistan and the United States have increased. As for the HEU, the total amount of HEU stockpiles decreased, although HEU for military use rose slightly.
- 20 out of the 27 countries surveyed still possess weapons-usable nuclear material that could be attractive to terrorists.

Accession to Nuclear Security and Safety-Related Conventions and their Application to Domestic Systems

- There were new ratifications for all nuclear security related conventions, except for the CPPNM.
- Regarding the implementation of “Nuclear Security Recommendations on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5)”, some surveyed countries announced their efforts, such as introducing new measures and reviewing existing measures.

Efforts to Maintain and Improve the Highest Level of Nuclear Security


- On HEU minimization for civilian use, Japan has completed the conversion from HEU to HALEU at one facility and has reiterated its commitment to convert a second facility. The United States also converted 2.2 tons of HEU into HALEU.
- Pakistan has announced plans to accept an IPPAS mission in 2026.
- Regarding multilateral initiatives, activities were carried out by the G7, such as the Non-Proliferation Directors’ Group. Meanwhile, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), co-chaired by the United States and Russia, has paused all activities since 2022. In its stead, the United States launched the Global Forum to Prevent Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism (Global FTPRNT) in 2024, although it remains unclear whether the initiative will be sustained in the longer term. Initiatives derived from the Nuclear Security Summit Process were also inactive, except for those related to insider threats.

6-Point Nuclear Disarmament Radar Charts (NWS)


The following radar charts aim to illustrate where NWS stand in different aspects of nuclear disarmament. For this purpose, the 14 issues used for nuclear disarmament evaluation were grouped into six aspects. According to the radar charts, China is required to improve its efforts for nuclear weapons reduction and transparency. Russia and the United States are urged to pursue further reductions of their nuclear arsenals. The performances of France and the United Kingdom are relatively well-balanced, compared to the other NWS. Still, those two countries need to enhance their efforts regarding reductions, commitments and operational policies.

Aspects	Issues
Number	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of nuclear weapons
Reduction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduction of nuclear weapons
Commitments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) • Commitments to achieving a world without nuclear weapons • Humanitarian consequence of nuclear weapons • Disarmament and non-proliferation education and cooperation with the civil society • Hiroshima and Nagasaki Peace Memorial Ceremonies
Operational policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Diminishing roles and significance of nuclear weapons in the national security strategies and policies • De-alerting and measures to extend decision time for nuclear weapon use
Multilateral treaties	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) • Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)
Transparency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transparency regarding nuclear forces, fissile material for nuclear weapons, and nuclear strategy/doctrine • Verifications • Irreversibility


 **China**




 **France**




 **Russia**




 **United Kingdom**




 **United States**



Nuclear Disarmament



Nuclear Non-Proliferation



Nuclear Security

